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The governance of REDD+: an institutional analysis in the Asia Pacific region and 
beyond 
This paper explores the changing nature of North/South relations in 
contemporary climate change governance. Focussing on the United Nations 
Collaborative Programme to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation (REDD+) the paper presents a theoretical framework, through which 
stakeholder perceptions of REDD+ governance quality and institutional 
legitimacy can be evaluated. This is tested by means of a small-n survey of state 
and non-state participants from both the developed and developing countries, and 
including the Asia-Pacific region. The survey results reveal generally higher 
ratings for REDD+ amongst Southern participants than in the North. A number of 
caveats are placed on the interpretation of data, and some conclusions drawn 
regarding contemporary climate governance and the emergence of a possible 
‘South/North Divide’, challenging traditional notions of global power politics. 
Keywords: climate change, governance, REDD+, South/North Divide 
1: Introduction 
While it is fair to say that the sharp contrast between developed and developing 
countries in climate negotiations has blurred in recent times, and that geo-political 
alliances in the South have become fragmented post-Copenhagen, it is still too early to 
dismiss the North/South divide as no longer relevant. As the authors will argue, the 
arrival of one of the most significant and emerging post-Kyoto replacements, the United 
Nations Collaborative Programme to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation, now referred to as REDD+, has generated a new range of governance 
dynamics around which different stakeholder interests are converging. The aim of this 
paper is to explore these changing circumstances, through a historical analysis and 
investigation into recent developments in contemporary climate governance, focussing 
on REDD+ and the attitudes of participating stakeholders from the developing countries 
(or the global South), and the developed countries (or the global North).  
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The 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) played 
an important normative role in shaping the general response to the environmental crisis, 
bringing market-based approaches as a method of environmental problem solving to the 
fore (Arts 2006). Another positive outcome, and enshrined in substantive document of 
the event, Agenda 21, was the recognition given to the participation of non-state 
interests, particularly non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the framework of 
international environmental policy and environmental decision-making at all levels 
(United Nations 1993). The historical precedents set by Rio have engendered a 
conceptual evolution away from talking almost exclusively about government (“control 
exercised by the nation-state, through formal (usually elected) parties”) towards 
governance (“control exercised by a variety of public and private institutions that have 
been established at different spatial scales”) (Perrons 2004, p. 255). Climate governance 
reflects the growing preference for social-political forms of stakeholder interaction with 
decentralised networks made up of multiple actors functioning at multi-levels, and 
including NGOs and the private sector (Juhola and Westerhoff 2011; Haas 2002). This 
has implications for the nature of relations between state, society and the economy, and 
for previous notions of legitimacy (Bulkeley 2010). Non-state actors, previously outside 
the formal decision-making arenas, now play a role in the formation of public policy, 
albeit from the sidelines, and their participation is challenging traditional conceptions of 
power and authority. The Kyoto Protocol in particular has opened up climate change to 
market mechanisms, creating governance structures which require cooperation between 
state and non-state actors, although nation-states ultimately endorse them (Andonova et 
al. 2009).  
But Rio was not without its conflicts. Over the course of the conference 
discussions broke down into two distinct camps, with the global South arguing that 
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industrialised, largely Northern, countries were seeking to externalise the costs of the 
environmental problems they had first created onto developing states (Birnie 2000). In 
the climate governance arena, it has been contended that the more powerful the country, 
the greater influence they have on international policy positions that best suit 
themselves (Okereke 2010). Indeed, the North/South Divide has been identified as one 
of the contributing factors to an almost complete institutional ossification of the climate 
change regime (Depledge 2008). This has led to the governance of climate change being 
characterised as a classic example of arrested development (Young 2010). It might be 
easiest to respond by simply agreeing that the relations between the developed and 
developing country participants in climate change negotiations continue to be reinforced 
by historical divisions. But the conventional North/South analysis appears to be shifting. 
Interestingly, it is around the Kyoto Protocol’s three market-based ‘flexibility’ 
mechanisms, the international emissions trading (IET), joint implementation (JI) and 
most notably, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) where there has been the 
most significant meeting of developed and developing country minds, and as will be 
demonstrated below, in REDD+. The CDM in particular has allowed Northern 
investment in mitigation projects in developing countries and the purchase of associated 
emissions to ‘offset’ domestic emissions. These mechanisms, initially opposed by 
northern NGOs, the European Union, and the South, have nevertheless had the effect of 
encouraging negotiation and co-operation between developing and developing 
countries, since much of the implementation occurs in the South, whilst the North reaps 
the benefits by offsetting its emissions (Mejía 2010). The fact that these reductions can 
be purchased at a lower cost than via domestic action has made the CDM economically 
efficient and attractive method of tackling climate change (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 
2007). 
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Consequently, a more revisionist analysis separates North/South relations into 
three distinct phases over the life of climate negotiations to date. The first is portrayed 
as consisting of a formal, institutionalized divide through the designation of Convention 
participants as being either Annex I Parties, i.e. developed countries, or Non-Annex I 
Parties. The second stage was largely dominated by internal North-North struggles 
between various alliances either in support of, or reluctant to ratify, the Kyoto Protocol 
and implement market mechanisms. The third, current, period is one of increasing 
North-South cooperation around Kyoto implementation. This more contemporary 
period is nevertheless also commensurate with a fragmentation of Southern interests, 
culminating in the Copenhagen Accord of 2010. It was at this point in the negotiations 
that the least developed countries and small island states were separated from the other 
developing countries, which were required to put in place mandatory climate mitigation 
measures (Mejía 2010). 
China has played a significant role in shifting developing countries’ positioning 
over whom should take responsibility for global emissions. In the post-Copenhagen 
environment it has emerged as the foremost challenger to the negotiating hegemony of 
the US (Mejía 2010). It should also be noted that China has been a major beneficiary of 
the CDM. An examination of uptake demonstrates that as at 2006 67 per cent of the 
total registered CDM projects were in Brazil (8 percent), India (23 percent) and China 
(36 percent) (Kedia et al. 2006). By 2008 this had risen to 12 percent, 40 percent and 59 
percent respectively (Dechezleprêtre et al. 2009). As of 3 August 2011, 3340 CDM 
projects have been registered in 71 developing countries and these projects are 
anticipated to generate more than 2030 million tCO2e by the end of 2012 (UNFCCC, 
2011). See Figure 1 and Table 1 below. 
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Figure 1 Trends in the cumulative number of CDM projects registered in various 
countries (UNFCCC, 2011). Note: 2010 data includes only those CDM projects, which 
were registered between 1 January and 16 February 2010. 
 
 
Country Percentage 
China 45.21 
India 21.14 
Brazil 5.81 
Mexico 3.86 
Malaysia 2.87 
Indonesia 2.1 
Viet Nam 2.07 
Korea 1.83 
Others 15.11 
 
Table 1 Registered CDM projects by host country (UNFCCC 2011) 
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In the case of India, initial opposition towards the trading of emissions has 
shifted to reflect acceptance of its merits (Depledge 2008). It is also worth noting that it 
is the emergent bloc of BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) have 
been identified as playing a contributory role in the Southern post-Copenhagen 
fragmentation (Hallding et al 2011; Mejía 2010).  
Researchers have identified a gap in existing knowledge and have called for 
more a detailed understanding of relations between the issues and interests at play in the 
governance of climate policy, particularly in terms of North/South dynamics (Bumpus 
and Cole 2010). It is worth pointing out in this regard that despite the disagreements at 
Copenhagen, discussions regarding the ongoing development of REDD+ continued 
relatively unaffected and Parties did not break down into negotiating blocs around the 
initiative (Mejía 2010). This makes REDD+ particularly interesting from a governance 
perspective, and would appear to reinforce a contention amongst researchers that forest 
governance provides the ideal locality in which to scrutinise “the increasing tendency 
for collaboration in many sectors where political and economic trade-offs also exist” 
(Overdevest 2004, p. 192). 
2: REDD+ origins, architecture and governance challenges 
The original idea of providing payments in exchange for actively preserving forests as 
part of a market-based trading system, and thus reducing emissions from deforestation 
(RED), has been accredited to Columbia University MBA graduate Kevin Conrad. By 
the time the Kyoto Protocol was formally ratified in 2004 deforestation had effectively 
dropped off the agenda. Conrad, founder of the Coalition of Rainforest Nations 
representing the main rainforest regions, successfully lobbied the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to consider his proposal as a 
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mechanism for re-integrating action on deforestation back into the climate change talks 
(Kwon 2006). Both the Stern and IPCC reports of 2007 demonstrated that deforestation 
contributes approximately 18 per cent of anthropogenic CO2 emissions. These provided 
an intellectual rationale for the decision at the Bali Conference of the Parties (COP) 13 
in the same year to consider measures to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation (REDD). In September 2008, the UN-REDD Programme was launched to 
support reduction-related strategies at the national level (Rosendal and Andresen 2011).  
A survey of REDD activities undertaken in 2009 identified 100 REDD 
demonstration activities and nearly 80 REDD readiness activities (Cerbu et al. 2011). 
Demonstration activities refer to actions put in place in a given sub-national region or 
forest management unit, such as a national park, aimed at reducing deforestation or 
forest degradation in that given locality. REDD readiness activities have higher, 
national-level objectives, usually around capacity building, policy development, or 
monitoring land-use change. The greatest numbers of readiness and demonstration 
activities were in Indonesia and Brazil, countries which both have considerable potential 
for the reduction of forest-based emissions. Readiness activities were also being 
implemented in Africa, Latin America, and the East Asia/Pacific region (Cerbu et al. 
2011).  
In the wake of COP-15 in Copenhagen, the initiative was altered to ‘REDD+’ to 
reflect the initiative’s growing emphasis on conserving and enhancing forests on the 
basis of their value for carbon sequestration, rather than simply reducing emissions 
(Parker et al. 2010). This shift in terminology signified a stronger commitment, albeit 
without guarantee, that the co-benefits of protecting both livelihoods and biodiversity 
should be on an equal level with carbon uptake and storage (Rosendal and Andresen 
2011). It is not yet certain if REDD+ incentives in the future will be funded via 
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multilateral development banks or bilateral measures, or whether it will be linked to 
carbon markets and involvement from the private sector or through hybrid combinations 
of public finance and market-driven REDD+ ‘credits’ (Reed 2010 cited in Corbera and 
Schroeder 2011). The uncertainty regarding the development of a genuinely global 
carbon market post COP-15 may also have the negative impact of constraining private 
investment, despite the enthusiasm for REDD+ at Copenhagen (Corbera et al. 2010). 
Although there is a strong, economic rationale to use market-based or at least 
market-linked instruments in this policy field, experience with the CDM shows that 
carbon governance is a dynamic policy arena. An important question for REDD+ is 
whether structural and procedural aspects will be given sufficient weight so that as 
meaningful participation of stakeholders as possible takes place (Lederer, 2011). Here 
the expectation – from the perspective of NGOs, at least – is that the mechanism 
becomes part of the solution to climate change and not part of the problem. REDD+ 
consequently requires governance systems that are capable of addressing governance 
realities on the ground (Global Witness 2009). There is a danger that the fiduciary and 
participatory discourses within REDD+ may come into conflict. Environmental and 
social NGOs are particularly wary of the potential for funding to subvert safeguards for 
Indigenous peoples and good governance. This is particularly the case regarding the 
implementation of Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs), which, as a 
consequence of the Copenhagen Accord, will now also be undertaken by developing 
countries, and funded by developed countries. At COP 16 in Cancun the provisions 
regarding NAMAs were agreed to by the Parties separately from, but linked to, REDD+ 
negotiations, leading NGOs to speculate that this might generate “perverse and 
contradictory outcomes” (ECA 2011, p. 2).  
  10 
The success of REDD+ as an international mechanism will further depend on 
the existence of governance arrangements that are also able to deliver both emission 
reductions at scale (i.e. solve the problem), as well as being transparent, and inclusive. 
Global decision-making processes will need to include methods that engage 
representatives of a range of non-state interests, including forest dependent peoples, 
civil society organizations, and the private sector. So far, advance negotiation texts have 
included references to the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities, even if 
there is still a need for greater clarity around issues such as tenure, and ownership of 
forest carbon (Lyster, 2011). REDD+, and its recognition of forest peoples’ rights, has 
the potential to improve climate governance more broadly (Anon 2010). Decision-
making also needs to be equitable, and cater for a range of needs, both relating to 
communities most at risk from climate change, as well as broader concerned 
communities (Barnett 2010). If projects can be designed to build on the lessons learned 
from previous tropical forest conservation and development initiatives, it may be able to 
advance climate and forest governance in ways that previous mechanisms have not 
(Blom et al. 2010). The governance arrangements necessary for REDD+ to meet such 
expectations are discussed immediately below. 
3: Theoretical approach to assessing the governance dimensions of 
international environmental policy 
Concerns about REDD+ often centre upon gaps in legitimacy, and not just specific 
institutional or technical aspects, particularly amongst developing country stakeholders 
(Streck et al., 2010). Legitimacy is a core analytical problem for governance scholars 
but its study is still in its infancy (Biermann & Gupta, 2011; Biermann et al., 2009). 
Two theories currently dominate. Legitimacy can be ‘input oriented’: that is, derived 
from the consent of those being asked to agree to the rules, and concerning such 
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procedural issues as the democratic arrangements underpinning a given system. 
Legitimacy can also be ‘output oriented’: derived from the efficiency of rules, or criteria 
for ‘good’ governance, and demonstrated by substantive outcomes (Scharpf 1997, cited 
in Kjaer 2004). Lederer (2011) argues that output-oriented legitimacy/effectiveness can 
be achieved in REDD+ but that a higher degree of input-oriented legitimacy is also 
necessary for REDD+, which may require a trade-off between the two forms of 
legitimacy. The best way to enable this alignment is to examine how stakeholder 
involvement is facilitated in REDD+ processes: both in terms of the extent to which 
participation is as unconstrained as possible; and the degree to which the real concerns 
and needs of these communities are voiced within deliberations as programmes and 
projects move forward. It is only through significant interaction that stakeholder 
interests can be aligned from the local community level, to international negotiations 
(Thompson et al. 2011).  
Unless significant attention is paid to such matters REDD+ will simply be 
another contribution to an ongoing of narrative of maginalization of vulnerable 
stakeholders by development and conservation projects (Thompson et al., 2011). This 
has resulted in the recognition that more research is needed, which explores the 
governance quality of REDD+ (Corbera and Schroeder 2011; Thompson et al., 2011). A 
second, equally important, and related observation is that greater attention should be 
paid to evaluating the success of climate change policies on the basis of the social 
processes, which drive decision-making (Barnett 2010). This is all the more pressing in 
view of the fact that governance, as opposed to government, is increasingly 
acknowledged as a primary means by which social and political interaction can be 
understood in the global context of state, society, the environment, and the market. This 
perspective is predicated on recognising the significance of: 
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[S]ocial-political governing processes (and structures), that take both interactions 
and actors seriously. Interactions shape actors and actors shape interactions as well. 
They are ‘equal’ as basic units of analysis and theory development (Kooiman 2000, 
p. 163). 
This is an important observation, since it grounds theory and practice within the 
normative assumption that structures and processes are fundamental to understanding 
the quality of interactions between participants in contemporary governance. The 
implications of these statements in terms of evaluating governance quality can be 
expressed in an integrated conceptual model (Figure 2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Theoretical model for the evaluation of contemporary global governance 
(Cadman 2011a, adapted).  
 
The figure implies that inputs and outputs are both related to legitimacy. Structural and 
procedural inputs such as participation and deliberation are only of value in so far as 
they deliver results; otherwise they can engender ‘decoy’ institutions, created for the 
purposes of appearing to deliver results, whilst not actually doing anything (Dimitrov 
INSTITUTIONAL  
CONTEXT 
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Structure Process Interaction 
Inputs 
Outcomes 
Outputs 
Legitimacy 
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2006). On the other hand, there is little point to an institution that delivers results, but 
either ignores or overrides the discussions of participants. In this case collaboration and 
due process will have been sacrificed, and there is unlikely to be very much long-term 
ownership and implementation of the outcomes generated (Cadman 2011b). 
Where they exist, studies attempting to evaluate governance quality tend to 
focus on a range of institutional attributes, as the brief review above has demonstrated. 
The term ‘governance arrangement’ is generally used to refer to a range of specific 
mechanisms influencing “the interaction between various actors pursuing common 
goals” (Koenig-Archibugi 2006, p. 24). These institutional arrangements, identified 
across the fields of governance theory, have a bearing on governance quality. The 
problem with these studies is that the attributes chosen are arbitrary, limited in number, 
and not logically related to each other, reflecting rather the specific objectives of the 
research, than the whole suite of arrangements necessary for quality of governance. The 
current focus on accountability and transparency is a good example. Recent work on 
global governance and forest management addresses these criticisms through the 
development of an analytical framework around two core features of governance 
arrangements: structure and process, and elaborated as ‘participation as structure and 
‘deliberations process’. The structural features focus on which actors are viewed as 
valid participants. In contrast, process requirements focus on the means employed to 
reach decisions and implement them. Two principles have been created to emphasise 
those normative values underpinning participation and deliberation: participation is 
expected to be meaningful (i.e. that involvement is genuine rather tokenistic); 
deliberation is expected to be productive (i.e. that discussion and dialogue is fruitful and 
actually delivers outputs, that can be acted upon). Based on this division between 
structure as participation and process as deliberation, the meaning of these two 
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principles is elaborated by developing criteria and indicators to examine the degree to 
which they are achieved in a given institutional policy context (Cadman 2011a). 
Principles and criteria are not usually capable of being measured directly either, but are 
formulated to provide a determination on the degree of compliance. They are 
consequently linked to indicators, which are hierarchically lower, and which represent 
quantitative or qualitative parameters, and do describe conditions indicative of the state 
of the governance system as they relate to the relevant criterion. The intention behind 
the placement of these attributes within such a framework is to ensure that they are 
located at the right level, to allow for a top-down analysis of principles via criteria and 
subsequently to indicators. Consistency in this context relates to the correct location 
within the framework: it is important that elements are placed at the appropriate level 
and do not overlap or duplicate those at another, and are linked back to the appropriate 
parameter at a higher level (Lammerts van Bueren and Blom 1997).  
It should be noted that the key governance concept of legitimacy, identified by 
many scholars, is not directly included, as it is understood as the end point of activity 
within the institution. Here, it is determined by the degree of successful interaction 
between the governance system’s structural and procedural components, i.e. an 
integrating model, as depicted in Figure 1. Input and output legitimacy are reconciled 
here. The normative concept being stressed is that the ends and means are equally 
important (even if they are not always evenly treated in reality). Both are related and 
consequential one to another and both play a role in legitimacy. By measuring 
performance at the indicator level it is possible to ascertain the level of fulfillment at the 
criterion and principle levels, and ultimately develop an institutional legitimacy rating. 
The framework is set out in Table 2 below. 
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Table 2 Hierarchical framework for the assessment of governance quality (Cadman 
2011a). 
Principle Criterion Indicator 
“Meaningful participation” Interest representation Inclusiveness 
Equality 
Resources 
Organisational responsibility Accountability 
Transparency 
“Productive deliberation” Decision making Democracy 
Agreement 
Dispute settlement 
Implementation Behavioural 
change 
Problem solving 
Durability 
3.1: Method 
This paper adopts the viewpoint that studying stakeholders’ perceptions from both 
developed and developing countries to the evolving governance of REDD+ provides 
insights into both the governance quality of the initiative, and the views of specific geo-
political and sectoral participants. International and national level stakeholders 
associated with REDD+ were asked to rate the governance performance of the initiative, 
using a Likert scale from ‘very low’ to ‘very high’ (1-5), on the basis of their own 
perspectives, by means of an online survey. Each survey was ‘static’, i.e. collected over 
a set period of time (one month). By comparing the results with previous surveys it has 
been possible to undertake ‘cuts’ into REDD+ over time, to track changes in 
perceptions regarding governance arrangements, and observe shifting attitudes amongst 
participating stakeholder sectors. The questions, linked to their relevant indicators, are 
set out in Table 3 below. 
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Table 3 Summary of survey questions 
Indicator Question 
Inclusiveness Do you think REDD+ is inclusive of your interests? 
Equality Do you think REDD+ treats all interests equally? 
Resources What level of resources does REDD+ provide for you to participate? 
Accountability Do you think the various institutional elements in which you participate are accountable in their dealings with you regarding the 
REDD+ process? 
Transparency Do you think the various institutional elements in which you participate are transparent in their dealings with you regarding the 
REDD+ process? 
Democracy Do you consider the REDD+ processes in which you participate to act 
in a democratic manner? 
Agreement Do you consider the making of agreements in REDD+ to be effective? 
Dispute settlement Do you consider the settling of disputes in REDD+ to be effective? 
Behavioural change Do you think REDD+ will contribute to changing the behaviour that leads to deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries? 
Problem solving Do you think REDD+ will help solve the problem of deforestation and 
forest degradation in developing countries? 
Durability Do you consider REDD+ will be durable? 
Note: explanatory text and introductory materials omitted 
 
The results presented here focus firstly on the perspectives of environmental and 
governmental respondents from both developed and developing countries, referred to in 
the survey as global North and global South, with respondents identifying themselves 
with one or other of these localities. Participants were recruited variously from publicly 
available Internet lists of organizational representatives active in the REDD+ 
negotiations, workshop participants, or otherwise named as being associated with 
REDD+. The invitation to participate in the survey was blind carbon copied to 
recipients, who were encouraged to disseminate the survey further. Due to anonymity 
provisions only the researchers had access to the individual email addresses collected, 
and knowledge of the specific lists used.  
The surveys were conducted in November 2009, March 2010 and September 
2010. Respondents were asked to identify themselves as ‘environmental’, ‘social’, and 
‘economic’ (to capture non-state interests associated with sustainable development), as 
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well as ‘government’, ‘secretariat or other institutional component’ (to capture any 
REDD+ administrative staff associated with the initiative), and ‘other’. Respondents 
were also asked to identify themselves in geo-political terms, i.e. ‘global North’ and 
‘global South’. Environmental stakeholders identified were from a range of 
international and national environmental NGOs. Social stakeholders included 
Indigenous Peoples’ Organizations (IPOs) encompassing regional representative bodies 
as well as individual tribal members, and ethnic groups. Economic interests included 
international business advocacy groups, financial organizations, and consultants active 
at the national level. Governments included Parties to the Convention, such as 
representatives from ministries with responsibility for REDD+. ‘Secretariat or other 
institutional component’ included the various REDD+ related mechanisms. 
Respondents were not targeted directly on the basis of their particular affiliations, 
however, but were asked to self-identify the sector and region to which they felt they 
belonged. ‘Other’ was therefore also made available as a choice, and included natural 
resource management organizations, and groups with what they perceived to be both an 
environmental and social mandate. These demographics are included in Table 3 below. 
For confidentiality reasons, individual organizations and countries cannot be named, but 
it is possible to disclose that respondents came from Africa, North and South America, 
the Asia Pacific region, and Europe.  
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Table 4 Percentage breakdown REDD+ related stakeholders by survey, region and 
sector (rounded to nearest percentile). 
Survey Region Sector Total 
number 
per 
survey Environ
-mental 
Social Economic Govern-
ment 
Secretariat Other 
1. November 
2009 
North 49% 5% 3% 3% 0% 3% 
39 
South 13% 0% 0% 13% 0% 3% 
2. March 2009 North 14% 0% 0% 7% 2% 7% 
42 
South 40% 2% 0% 23% 0% 2% 
3. September 
2010 
North 16% 2% 0 16% 0% 6% 
50 
South 36% 0% 2% 20% 0% 2% 
3.1 September 
2010: Asia 
Pacific  
North 11% 0% 0 26% 0% 11% 
19 
South 47% 0% 5% 0 0% 0 
Note: i) percentages rounded to nearest whole number; ii) totals include all respondents 
who attempted the survey (but may not have answered all questions) 
The scores of the relevant indicators were added to determine performance at the 
criterion level. In turn, the relevant criteria were added to determine performance at the 
principle level; finally, the two principle scores were combined to determine overall 
performance. In order to compare perceptions, respondents were stratified into four sub-
groups: (1) environment North; (2) environment South; (3) government North and (4) 
government South. Using standard statistical methods, the average ratings of each of the 
four sub-groups were in turn used to calculate the weighted averages for the two main 
groups (environment and government). In order to ascertain the overall perceptions of 
all respondents, combined weighted averages were subsequently also evaluated and 
compared. 
It should also be noted that survey respondents were not necessarily replicated 
across surveys. Stakeholders were also encouraged to circulate the survey to their 
colleagues. The anonymity guarantee, whilst encouraging responses, made it difficult to 
determine the consistency of individual respondents across surveys. As an online 
survey, stakeholders with no email address, and no access to the Internet, were excluded 
from responding. Respondents may be the more privileged and well-resourced 
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stakeholders, especially in developing countries. Finally it should be noted that in some 
cases, the number of respondents does not constitute a representative sample of 
stakeholders. A greater number of respondents across sectors and regions in future 
surveys would help verify the sample size.  
3.2: Summary discussion of results and caveats 
Table 5 below is a breakdown of responses from environmental and government 
respondents, North and South. Table 6 contains the ratings of all respondents, North and 
South. Table 7 provides the results from Survey 3 as they pertain to respondents active 
in the Asia Pacific region, including both Northern and Southern actors (bearing in mind 
that developed country interests are associated with various countries and projects in 
developing nations). As table 4 indicates, not all sectors and regions responded 
consistently. Economic, social and secretariat respondents are either low or absent. 
Secondly, while some sectors may have responded, representation by North/South 
regions is also incomplete. Thirdly, overall numbers of participants for some sectors and 
regions are low. However, it should be noted that environmental and government 
respondents responded consistently across sectors and regions (although 
government/South is not present in the Asia-Pacific sub-set of Survey 3). A case could 
be made for viewing these two sectors as constituting the two ‘poles’ along a non-
state/state governance continuum (Jordan et al 2005). To a certain extent, these two sets 
of interest are representative of state/non-state perspectives regarding the governance 
quality of REDD+. 
In view of the discussions above regarding the changing dynamics in North-
South relations, perhaps the most interesting features of the three surveys is the 
generally higher ratings for REDD+ governance quality given by respondents from the 
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global South in comparison to their counterparts in the global North in both Tables 5 
and 6; in Table 6 the difference is pronounced. For the Asia-Pacific region the results in 
Table 7 appear to be reversed. The absence of Southern governmental respondents does 
not allow for a balanced comparison between regions, although this is partly offset by 
economic participation in the survey. A further point of interest is the increase in the 
overall rating provided by respondents regarding the perceived legitimacy of REDD+ 
over time. The rise between Survey 1 and Survey 2 would appear to reflect historical 
events. Whilst other negotiations were not overwhelmingly successful, REDD+ 
discussions at COP-15 were relatively productive. On another matter, the similarity 
between the combined ratings for REDD+ in Table 5 (government and environmental 
respondents, North and South) and those in Table 6 (all respondents, North and South) 
is very close. This would seem to lend some credence to the view that in circumstances 
where other stakeholders are less responsive, environmental and government 
respondents represent useful surrogates for evaluating the state/non-state perspective 
regarding the quality and legitimacy of global environmental governance. 
It is particularly interesting to note the scores given to REDD+ by environmental 
and governmental stakeholders in both the North and South. It is often assumed that 
environmental and governmental stakeholders are diametrically opposed to each other’s 
perspectives in climate negotiations: environmental NGOs often demand tougher action, 
whilst governments deliver less than is often hoped for. Although there is a discrepancy 
between the scores accorded to REDD+ by these sectors, there is a general 
correspondence in overall perceptions: where Northern governments rate REDD+ lower 
than their Southern counterparts, so too do environmental respondents. Southern 
governments and environmental NGOs also have a gap in their rating, but again, there 
are correspondingly higher results across both sectors. In this regard, it seems that the 
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nature of the perceptions of REDD+ governance quality of Northern and Southern 
governments and their NGO opposites is one of convergence of opinion rather than 
divergence. The difference is to be found in the degree of confidence in REDD+. It 
might be expected to see governments’ views converge with governments, and the same 
for NGOs, but once again, geo-political factors seems to come into play, rather than 
sectoral affiliation. 
On an indicator level, most results hover somewhere in the “medium-high” 
band, although this varies somewhat on the particular stakeholder. One clear standout is 
the rising score for inclusiveness across stakeholder sectors, which would appear to 
indicate a growing level of responsiveness within the mechanism to the varied interests 
seeking to influence REDD+ development. The next highest indicators for behaviour 
change, problem solving and durability also demonstrate a degree of confidence in the 
future ability of REDD+ to make a positive contribution to reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions. The low scoring indicators (resources, agreement, dispute settlement) should 
be a cause for concern. The provision of resources, whether they be to provide 
economic, technical or structural support for participation are fundamental to the 
development of policy capable of resolving ecological problems effectively (Jänicke 
1992 cited in Mason 1999). There was also a general low score for dispute settlement. 
This is a universal problem in global environmental agreements. Without existing 
institutional arrangements being changed in favour of more productive interaction, 
global environmental negotiations will continue to produce inadequate results (Susskind 
2004). Dispute-resolution mechanisms are essential for handling conflict and complaints 
when they occur around common pool resources, when problems arise that can only be 
solved by collective action (Ostrom 1990). Two of the most significant contributors to 
governance failure are inability to resolve conflicts, and the breakdown of engagement 
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and negotiation processes (Stoker 2000). It is significant that while individual sectors 
may rate specific indicators more or less generously, there is a high degree of 
convergence of views – including the Asia Pacific – on the strongest and weakest 
indicators. Combined with the similarities in views amongst environmental and 
governmental respondents in the North, and their opposites in the South – degrees of 
confidence notwithstanding – there is a case to be made for arguing that these results are 
representative of stakeholder opinions regarding REDD+. If this is the case, the results 
presented here constitute a good starting point for institutional improvements, which 
both target the weakest indicators, and address the concerns of the least satisfied 
stakeholders.  
4: Concluding comments 
As the introductory discussions above have indicated, the international climate regime 
has been criticised for its bias against the South, which, it is argued, results in systemic 
injustice. This bias is entrenched it is further asserted, by the economic imperatives 
which are entrenched in the neo-liberal, market-based approach to problem solving. 
Concerns have been raised that the North, by the use of such instruments, is seeking to 
avoid its historic responsibility as a major emitter of greenhouse gasses. The legitimacy 
of global climate governance has also been challenged on account of its lack of 
participation and inclusiveness as well as its non-transparent decision-making. This 
viewpoint has been challenged, and the analysis in this paper confirms a change in 
historical North/South relations, even if the inherently neo-liberal market-based agenda 
remains. In a sense, REDD+ facilitates a co-incidence of developed and developing 
country self-interest: the North can offset its emissions, and undertake sustainable 
development in the South at the same time. As an initiative ‘to’ the South, ‘from’ the 
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North, REDD+ consequently appears to contradict the previously orthodox North/South 
Divide discussed in the literature, by which the North generally benefits at the expense 
of the South. 
The results of the survey provide some interesting anecdotal information on 
stakeholders’ attitudes to the governance of climate change. Firstly, there appears to be 
a fairly clear divide amongst respondents along geo-political lines. It may be drawing 
too long a bow to speak of an emerging ‘South/North Divide’, but the higher ratings 
from both environmental and government respondents from the South is intriguing. It 
appears as if Northern respondents are more disaffected with REDD+ than those from 
the South. Whether this reflects Northern donor country pessimism, in contrast to the 
optimism of developing countries – who are after all set to benefit financially from 
REDD+ in a potentially major way – is a matter of speculation. A tentative conclusion 
is that REDD+ has created a novel institutional imperative for maintaining the 
differences between the two geo-political regions, whilst simultaneously altering – and 
challenging – traditional power dynamics. Clearly, there is room for further research, to 
see if the trends identified here are more broadly representative of stakeholder 
perceptions across the REDD+ community. Whatever the explanation underlying 
respondents’ perceptions, their views on REDD+ governance quality, are certainly 
important. The low scoring indicators across sectors and regions should especially 
encourage REDD+ institutions and stakeholders to pay greater attention to governance 
quality in the future. In terms of international negotiations and actual implementation by 
countries and other interested parties it is not sufficient to include language in 
negotiating texts regarding transparency or inclusiveness, for example, without actually 
looking at making substantive institutional improvements to existing governance 
arrangements at all levels. REDD+ has the potential to become one of the most 
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significant examples of global environmental governance to emerge out of the climate 
negotiations. It is certainly already one of the most complex. Bearing this in mind, a 
governance focus is not esoteric, but essential. 
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Table 5: Consensus legitimacy rating of REDD+ by respondents from environment and government, global North and South: before and after and before COP 16  
Principle 
1. Meaningful Participation 
Maximum score: 25; 
Minimum: 5 
2. Productive deliberation 
Maximum score: 30 
Minimum: 6 
Total 
(out of 
55) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Criterion 
1. Interest representation 
Maximum score: 15 
Minimum: 3 
2. Organisational responsibility 
Maximum score: 10 
Minimum: 2 
Principle 
Score 
   
  
3. Decision-making 
Maximum score: 15 
Minimum: 3 
4. Implementation 
Maximum score: 15 
Minimum: 3 
Principle 
Score 
  
  
  Indicator  
Inclus-
iveness 
Equal-
ity 
Resou
rces 
Criterion 
Score 
Account-
ability 
Trans-
parency 
Criterion 
Score 
Demo
-cracy 
Agree
-ment 
Dispute 
settle-
ment 
Criterion 
Score 
Behav-
ioural 
change 
Prob-
lem 
solving 
Dura-
bility 
Criteri
on 
Score 
Environ-
ment 
North  
(6/19/7) 
2.6 1.8 1.6 6.0 2.8 2.8 5.5 11.5 2.3 2.3 2.2 6.8 2.8 2.5 3.4 8.8 15.6 27.1 
2.7 1.8 1.0 5.5 2.6 2.7 5.3 10.8 2.2 2.2 2.2 6.6 2.6 2.6 2.7 7.9 14.4 25.2 
3.6 2.7 1.7 8.0 2.6 2.5 5.1 13.1 2.8 2.3 2.5 7.5 3.1 3.1 3.1 9.4 16.9 30.1 
Environ-
ment: 
South  
(17/5/15) 
2.6 3.0 1.8 7.4 2.0 2.4 4.4 11.8 2.3 2.0 2.0 6.3 2.6 3.0 3.0 8.6 14.9 26.7 
3.3 2.7 2.2 8.1 3.5 3.4 6.8 14.9 2.7 2.9 2.5 8.1 3.1 2.9 3.4 9.4 17.5 32.4 
4.2 3.7 2.3 10.1 3.6 3.9 7.6 17.7 3.7 3.1 2.8 9.6 3.8 3.8 3.5 11.1 20.7 38.3 
Weighted 
Average 
2.6 2.1 1.6 6.3 2.6 2.7 5.3 11.6 2.3 2.2 2.1 6.7 2.8 2.6 3.4 8.8 15.4 27.0 
3.1 2.5 1.9 7.4 3.2 3.2 6.4 13.8 2.6 2.7 2.5 7.7 2.9 2.9 3.2 9.0 16.7 30.5 
4.0 3.3 2.1 9.5 3.3 3.5 6.8 16.2 3.4 2.8 2.7 8.9 3.6 3.6 3.4 10.6 19.5 35.7 
Govern-
ment 
North 
(3/1/7) 
5.0 4.0 1.0 10.0 3.0 4.0 7.0 17.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 12.0 4.0 4.0 5.0 13.0 25.0 42.0 
3.3 4.0 1.0 8.3 3.0 3.7 6.7 15.0 3.3 2.7 2.3 8.3 3.7 3.7 3.0 10.3 18.7 33.7 
4.1 3.7 2.5 10.3 3.4 3.4 6.9 17.2 4.1 3.2 3.2 10.5 3.9 3.6 3.6 11.1 21.6 38.8 
Govern-
ment 
South  
(10/5/9) 
3.2 2.6 2.2 8.0 3.3 3.2 6.5 14.5 3.2 3.0 2.5 8.7 2.6 2.4 2.8 7.8 16.5 31.0 
3.5 3.1 2.3 8.9 3.3 2.8 6.1 15.0 2.8 3.4 2.8 9.0 3.7 3.5 3.6 10.8 19.8 34.8 
3.9 3.7 1.8 9.4 3.1 3.5 6.6 16.0 3.5 3.2 3.3 10.0 4.0 3.9 4.3 12.2 22.2 38.2 
Weighted 
Average 
3.5 2.8 2.0 8.3 3.2 3.3 6.5 14.9 3.3 3.2 2.8 9.3 2.8 2.7 3.2 8.7 17.9 32.8 
3.5 3.3 2.0 8.8 3.2 3.0 6.2 15.0 2.9 3.2 2.7 8.8 3.7 3.5 3.5 10.7 19.5 34.6 
4.0 3.7 2.1 9.8 3.3 3.5 6.7 16.5 3.8 3.2 3.3 10.3 4.0 3.8 4.0 11.7 22.0 38.5 
Combined 
Weighted 
Averages 
2.8 2.2 1.7 6.7 2.7 2.8 5.5 12.2 2.5 2.4 2.3 7.2 2.8 2.6 3.3 8.7 15.9 28.2 
3.2 2.8 1.9 7.9 3.2 3.1 6.4 14.3 2.7 2.9 2.5 8.1 3.2 3.1 3.3 9.6 17.7 32.0 
4.0 3.5 2.1 9.6 3.3 3.5 6.8 16.3 3.6 3.0 2.9 9.5 3.8 3.6 3.7 11.1 20.5 36.9 
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Table 6 Consensus legitimacy rating of REDD+ participants by global North and South (before and after COP15 and before COP 16); Asia Pacific (before Cop 16) 
included.  
Principle 
1. Meaningful Participation 
Maximum score: 25; 
Minimum: 5 
2. Productive deliberation 
Maximum score: 30 
Minimum: 6 
 
 
Total 
(out 
of 
55) 
  
  
 
Criterion 
1. Interest representation 
Maximum score: 15 
Minimum: 3 
2. Organisational responsibility 
Maximum score: 10 
Minimum: 2 
Principle 
Score 
   
  
3. Decision-making 
Maximum score: 15 
Minimum: 3 
4. Implementation 
Maximum score: 15 
Minimum: 3 
 
 
Principle 
Score 
  
  
  
Indicator  Inclus-iveness 
Equal-
ity 
Resour-
ces 
Criterion 
Score 
Account-
ability 
Trans-
parency 
Criterion 
Score 
Demo-
cracy 
Agree-
ment 
Dispute 
settle-
ment 
Criterion 
Score 
Behav-
ioural 
change 
Problem 
solving 
Dura-
bility 
Criterion 
Score 
Global 
north 
(26/13/17) 
2.7 2.0 1.6 6.3 2.7 2.9 5.6 11.9 2.4 2.4 2.3 7.0 2.9 2.6 3.3 8.8 15.8 27.7 
2.9 2.2 1.3 6.4 2.9 2.9 5.8 12.1 2.9 2.5 2.3 7.7 2.9 2.8 2.9 8.7 16.3 28.5 
3.8 3.2 2.1 9.1 3.1 3.0 6.1 15.1 3.3 2.8 2.8 8.8 3.5 3.2 3.4 10.1 18.9 34.1 
Global 
South 
(12/27/25) 
3.1 3.0 1.9 8.0 2.6 2.8 5.4 13.4 2.8 2.6 2.3 7.7 2.4 2.5 2.8 7.8 15.4 28.8 
3.4 2.9 2.3 8.6 3.5 3.3 6.8 15.4 2.9 3.2 2.8 8.8 3.4 3.2 3.5 10.1 18.9 34.2 
4.1 3.7 2.0 9.8 3.4 3.8 7.1 16.9 3.6 3.1 3.0 9.7 3.8 3.7 3.8 11.3 21.0 38.0 
Weighted 
Average 
2.8 2.3 1.7 6.8 2.7 2.8 5.5 12.3 2.5 2.4 2.3 7.2 2.8 2.5 3.1 8.4 15.7 28.0 
3.2 2.7 2.0 7.9 3.3 3.1 6.4 14.3 2.9 2.9 2.6 8.4 3.2 3.1 3.3 9.6 18.1 32.4 
4.0 3.5 2.0 9.5 3.3 3.4 6.7 16.2 3.5 2.9 2.9 9.3 3.7 3.5 3.6 10.8 20.2 36.4 
Table 7 Survey 3 consensus legitimacy rating of REDD+ participants active in the Asia Pacific region by global North and South before Cop 16 (global North 
 and South results also included) 
Indicator  Inclus-iveness 
Equal-
ity 
Resour-
ces 
Criterion 
Score 
Account-
ability 
Trans-
parency 
Criterion 
Score 
Principle 
score 
Demo-
cracy 
Agree-
ment 
Dispute 
settle-
ment 
Criterion 
Score 
Behav-
ioural 
change 
Problem 
solving 
Dura-
bility 
Criterion 
Score 
Principle 
score 
Total 
(out 
of 
55) 
A-Pacific 
north (8) 4.6 4.0 2.6 11.1 3.6 3.5 7.1 18.2 3.8 3.6 3.1 10.5 3.9 3.7 3.8 11.3 21.8 40.0 
A-Pacific 
south (8) 4.1 3.9 1.9 9.9 3.4 3.8 7.2 17.1 3.6 3.2 3.0 9.8 3.1 3.2 2.9 9.2 19.0 36.1 
A-Pacific 
Weighted 
Average 
4.3 3.9 2.2 10.5 3.5 3.6 7.1 17.6 3.7 3.4 3.1 10.1 3.5 3.4 3.3 10.3 20.4 38.0 
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Notes: i) Figures in dark grey are the results pre-COP 15, light grey post-COP 15, clear pre-COP 16; ii) only complete responses included; iii) figures  
in brackets represent the number of respondents from each of the three surveys. 
 
 
